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You Say Fiduciary, I Say Binary: A Review and 
Recommendation of Robo-Advisors and the 
Fiduciary and Best Interest Standards 
 
Sophia Duffy, JD, CPA and  




Automated investment advice platforms, also known as “robo-
advisors”, are investment advice tools that have quickly grown in popularity 
over the last decade.  These sophisticated software platforms allow 
individuals to receive low-cost financial advice about various financial 
planning goals, such as creating or adjusting investment portfolios, 
retirement planning, education funding, and the like, simply by entering asset 
and demographic information into an online platform.  The robo-advisors 
automatically generate the financial advice based on the data inputs with 
little to no involvement from a human financial advisor.  The allure of these 
low-cost, easily accessible robo-advisors has captured a large segment of the 
consumer market. As robo-advisors grow, the regulatory outlook for 
investment advisors is changing.  The scope of fiduciary duty is 
encompassing more and more areas of financial advice.  In addition, a 
newcomer onto the liability field, known as the “best interest” standard, has 
elevated the liability standard for broker-dealers to a fiduciary-like status.  
This has created a contrast between automated, generic advice and the 
regulatory push towards personalized, fiduciary advice.  In this paper, we 
determine whether robo-advisors are able to meet the liability standards set 
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forth by regulators and recommend the ways in which robo-advisors can best 
serve consumers. 
We first discuss the fiduciary and best interest standards for investment 
advisors in depth by reviewing statutory language, whitepapers and guidance 
issued by various regulating bodies, and thought leadership put forth by 
industry experts.  Next, we evaluate whether robo-advisors are able to meet 
these standards by reviewing guidance from regulatory agencies and 
commentary from thought leaders, peer-reviewed articles, and regulators.  
We find that robo-advisors can meet the fiduciary standard when providing 
limited-scope investment advice, and can meet the best-interest standard in 
most cases.  However, robo-advisors may not rise to a fiduciary level when 
providing broad, comprehensive financial advice, such as preparation of an 
estate plan, retirement plan, or overall wealth management.  In our 
conclusion, we propose a clarification of regulatory language to 1) 
recommend the specific services for which robo-advisors are best or better-
suited compared to human investment advisors, and 2) prohibit robo-




Over the past decade, robo-advisors, or automated systems for 
providing financial advice and services, are becoming more and more 
popular.1  According to research conducted by Business Insider Intelligence, 
experts estimate that robo-advising platforms will manage $1 trillion in 
assets in 2020, and $4.6 trillion in assets by 2022.2  This is setting up an 
interesting challenge in the practice of financial advice.  Historically, 
financial advice was provided by human advisors3 who used automated 
systems as a supplementary tool.  For example, a human advisor would 
commonly use software to generate an ideal investment portfolio allocation 
for a client based on their spending goals, lifestyle, and retirement time 
horizon.  In recent years, these automated tools have become highly 
sophisticated, so much so that some services can be provided entirely by the 
 
 1. Marguerita Cheng, The Future of Wealthtech, FORBES, (Feb. 19, 2019, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/margueritacheng/2019/02/19/the-future-of-wealthtech/#33741 
49c35e6 (There are currently over 200 robo-advising platforms registered in the United 
States).   
 2. Sarah Kocianski, The Evolution of Robo-Advising: How Automated Investment 
Products are Disrupting and Enhancing the Wealth Management Industry, BUSINESS INSIDER, 
(July 3, 2017, 10:31 AM); https://www.businessinsider.com/the-evolution-of-robo-advising-
report-2017-7?IR=T. 
 3. The term “advisor” is used interchangeably with “adviser.”  Though the SEC prefers 
to use “-er”, the more common industry usage is “-or”.  We will use the “-or” ending for 
consistency in this paper. 
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software without any human involvement.  We will refer to these systems as 
“pure robo-advisors” in this paper (as opposed to a hybrid robo-advisor 
model, which would involve some human interaction).  A challenge this 
advancement in technology represents is how to regulate financial services 
when some or all of the advice derives from a computer.  While technology 
enables automated advisor services to be more widely accessible, the 
regulatory landscape seems to be requiring more personalized advisor-client 
relationships (which are more costly than less personalized advice).  
Numerous federal and state authorities, as well as industry regulatory bodies, 
have enacted or proposed regulations and standards to raise the level of 
liability for financial professionals providing different types of advisory 
services so that more of these professionals are held to a fiduciary or 
fiduciary-like standard.4   
This contrast between automated advice and the regulatory trend 
towards human-centered advice spurs two questions: First, what legal 
standard applies to robo-advisors? Second, what types of advisory services 
can a robo-advisor provide while still meeting the applicable legal standard? 
In this paper, we first look at the general regulatory environment for financial 
service professionals, recognizing that much of the law contemplates that the 
advisor is assumed to be human.  We then consider where pure robo-advising 
platforms can best fit within this regulatory framework.  Our conclusion will 
be that pure robo-advice works best in a limited scope client engagement 
such as investment advice and monitoring.  Lastly, we propose changes to 
the regulatory statutes that would enable robo-advisors to meet the 
applicable standard most effectively and clarify how robo-advisors should 
be utilized to provide financial advice. 
A note is in order concerning the terminology to be used in describing 
the person, firm or computer providing advice to the client.  The term 
“advisor” and “adviser” have historically had both identical and differing 
definitions, depending on the statute or regulation involved.5  And, as will be 
 
 4. New York, California, New Jersey, Maine, and other states have proposed new 
fiduciary standards ranging from a comprehensive standard for all financial professionals to 
fiduciary liability when providing advice in specific situations.  See Kevin L. Walsh and 
David N. Levine, A New Litigation Saga Begins for Another Best Interest Rule, 
INVESTMENTNEWS, Sept. 10, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/ 
20190910/BLOG09/190919995/a-new-litigation-saga-begins-for-another-best-interest-rule; 
see also The CFP Board will implement a fiduciary standard for all Certified Financial 
Professional designation holders in 2019; see also Directors of CFP Board Set Enforcement 
Date for New Code and Standards, CFP Board, (July 16, 2019), https://www.cfp.net/news-
events/latest-news/2019/07/16/directors-of-cfp-board-set-enforcement-date-for-new-’code-
and-standards’. 
 5. Michael Kitces, Financial Adviser vs. Advisor: What’s the Difference?, NERD’S EYE 
VIEW, (Aug 18, 2016), https://www.kitces.com/blog/financial-adviser-vs-advisor-vs-finan 
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discussed below, with the SEC a current distinction exists between whether 
the provider of advice can be called an “advisor” or “broker”.  For this paper, 
we are focused on financial advice, in whatever form it is provided. 
Consequently, and to make the analysis clearer, we will use the general term 
“advisor” to indicate an entity (human or robo) which is providing financial 
information and services to a client.   
 
THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE FOR FINANCIAL 
PROFESSIONALS 
 
The regulation of financial advisors began long before the presence of 
computers.  In fact, the landscape of federal regulations regarding the 
liability of financial professionals has been evolving for almost a century, 
beginning in 1934 with the enactment of the Securities and Exchange Act.6  
In recent years, the pace of regulatory change has kicked into high gear.  This 
regulatory acceleration is largely spurred by the growing retirement crisis 
and highly publicized ethical failures in the financial sector, such as the 
Madoff Ponzi scheme and the 2007-2008 mortgage crisis that triggered a 
U.S. recession and wreaked havoc among global financial markets.7  
Governmental agencies have increasingly pushed for more regulations to 
protect consumers of financial services from bad actors in the financial 
profession who recommended poor, and financially devastating, investments 
simply to earn higher income or receive other benefits. Note that most of this 
regulatory activity has been focused on human-based advisors.   
A history of recent regulatory activity shows mixed results in achieving 
this outcome.  While those financial professionals commonly deemed 
financial “advisors” have long been held to a fiduciary standard,8 the 
 
cial-planner-whats-the-difference/ (It’s worth noting in terms of registering as an investment 
adviser, and being subject to the legal standards of an investment adviser, it doesn’t actually 
matter whether you call yourself advisor with an O-R or adviser with an E-R.) 
 6. Mark Schoeff, Jr., A Historical Timeline of Fiduciary Duty for Financial Advice, 
INVESTMENTNEWS, (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.investmentnews.com/historical-timeline-
of-fiduciary-duty-for-financial-advice-66755. 
 7. “In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress recognized the need to ensure that 
retail investors can readily access unbiased advice from all financial professionals, regardless 
of whether that advice comes from an investment adviser or broker-dealer.”  See Attorneys 
General of New York, California, Connecticut, et al., Comments to Proposed Best Interest 
Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission, (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-07-18/s70718-4185784-172673.pdf. 
 8. The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires individuals who provide investment 
advice for compensation to refrain from fraud, deceptive practices, or material misstatements 
and omissions of information. See Investment Advisor Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 206 (1940); 
Although the term “fiduciary” is not explicit in the statute, it was first used to define the 
standard in the seminal case regarding advisor liability, SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
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Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of Labor 
(DOL) recently attempted, but were ultimately unable, to enact a 
comprehensive fiduciary standard for all financial professionals.9  The 
fiduciary standard is a highly protective standard of liability for services that 
require an agent (in this context, the financial professional), to act in the best 
interests of a principal (the client).10  After the federal efforts to impose a 
uniform fiduciary standard failed, many states and other regulating bodies 
have opted to take action on their own.11  These regulations aim to heighten 
the liability standard for any financial services professionals who provide 
advice, including those that are not defined as “advisors” under the 1940 Act.  
For example, under these attempts, those selling a life insurance policy,12 
 
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963). (“The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects 
a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory 
relationship”), and again in Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 97, U.S. 1292, 1295 (1977); see 
also Megan Ji, Note, Are Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Robo-Advisors Under the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 117 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1543, 1548 (2018); see also Lorna 
A. Schnase, An Investment Adviser’s Fiduciary Duty, The Fiduciary Institute, 7 (Aug. 1 2010), 
https://www.thefiduciaryinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/lornaschnaseFiduciary-D 
uty-Paper.pdf. 
 9. In 2016, the Department of Labor proposed regulations that would require all 
financial professionals working with retirement plans or providing advice related to retirement 
to act as fiduciaries towards the plan participants.  After vocal opposition by industry groups, 
numerous delays, and a change in the Presidency to a less regulatory-friendly regime, the 
“DOL fiduciary rule” was vacated by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2018.  The court 
vacated the proposed regulation on several grounds, including an unreasonable and arbitrary 
and capricious exercise of administrative power by the DOL, DOL regulatory overreach, and 
inconsistency with established regulations.  See Chamber of Commerce of the USA, et al., v. 
Department of Labor, et al., 17-10238 F.3d 360, 363, 384-385 (5th Cir. App. Ct. 1976); see 
also Melanie Waddell 5th Circuit Issues Order to Kill DOL Fiduciary Rule, THINK ADVISOR, 
(June 21, 2018, 12:54 PM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2018/06/21/5th-circuit-orders-
dol-fiduciary-rule-vacated/?slreturn=20191116123828. 
 10. The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires individuals who provide investment 
advice for compensation to refrain from fraud, deceptive practices, or material misstatements 
and omissions of information.  See 15 U.S.C. § 206. Although the term “fiduciary” is not 
explicit in the statute, it was first used to define the standard in the seminal case regarding 
advisor liability.  See Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. at 191. And again in Santa Fe 
Industries, 430 U.S. at 1295; see also Ji, supra note 7, at 1549. 
 11. See Walsh, supra note 4; see also The CFP Board will implement a fiduciary 
standard for all Certified Financial Professional designation holders in 2019; see also 
Directors of CFP Board Set Enforcement Date for New Code and Standards, CFP Board, 
(July 16, 2019), https://www.cfp.net/news-events/latest-news/2019/07/16/directors-of-cfp-
board-set-enforcement-date-for-new-’code-and-standards’. 
 12. See New York Superintendent of Financial Services, First Amendment to 11 
NYCRR 224 (July 17, 2018), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/docs/insurance/r_finala/2018/rf1 
87a1txt.pdf (proposes to hold individuals selling or providing advice related to life insurance 
policies to a best interest standard that is similar to a fiduciary standard). 
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advising or working with retirement plans,13 individuals holding the CFP® 
mark,14 and most notably, broker-dealers who perform transactions on behalf 
of a client,15 are or will be held to a fiduciary or a similar “best interest” 
standard. 
The result of these myriad efforts is an ever-evolving and complicated 
jumble of regulations that is difficult for the average financial professional 
to understand.  Regulators have acknowledged this fact and have stated that 
the various regulating bodies should work together to clarify and streamline 
the liability standards.16  Though this area continues to change at a rapid pace, 
a trend has clearly emerged towards increasing liability to a fiduciary-like 
standard for all financial professionals providing advice to individual 
consumers.  Two main categories of liability have evolved under these 
regulations: a broadened traditional fiduciary standard, and a new best-
interest standard.  
In this section, we provide a summary to highlight the complexity 
caused by the volume of regulations that cover this area, but we will focus 
more heavily on the fiduciary standard for three reasons: 1) the fiduciary 
standard applies most broadly to those providing comprehensive financial 
advice to individual clients, 2) the best interest standard is similar to the 
fiduciary standard in many ways so we will only highlight the primary 
differences; and 3) the regulation of robo-advisors, discussed later in this 




 13. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Employee Benefits and Security Admin., Meeting Your 
Fiduciary Responsibilities (Sept. 2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/about-
ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications/meeting-your-fiduciary-responsibilities.pdf. 
(Any individual making recommendations to an employer-sponsored retirement plan and 
charging a fee is a fiduciary under the ERISA regulation.). 
 14. See, Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Directors of CFP Board Set 
Enforcement Date for New Code and Standards, CFP Board (July 16, 2019), https://www. 
cfp.net/news-events/latest-news/2019/07/16/directors-of-cfp-board-set-enforcement-date-fo 
r-new-’code-and-standards’ (The CFP Board will implement a fiduciary standard for all 
Certified Financial Professional designation holders in 2019.). 
 15. See 15 U.S.C. § 202(a)(11)(c) 1940 (Historically, broker-dealers were not defined as 
advisors under the 1940 Act as long as they only provided advice “tangential” to performing 
some transaction on behalf of a client. “… any broker or dealer whose performance of such 
services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who 
receives no special compensation therefor” is not an advisor.). 
 16. See, Tobias Salinger, How Firms and Regulators Are Preparing for Reg BI’s 
‘Significant Impact’, FINANCIAL PLANNING (Sept. 10 2019, 1:19 PM), https://www.financial-
planning.com/news/how-finra-sec-nasaa-are-implementing-reg-bi; see also, Mark Schoeff 
Jr., FINRA Will Defer to SEC on Interpreting Best Interest Rule, INVESTMENTNEWS (Sep. 9 
2019, 4:17 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190909/FREE/190909946/fin 
ra-will-defer-to-sec-on-interpreting-best-interest-rule. 
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FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR INVESTMENT ADVISORS 
 
Financial advisors, defined as individuals who provide financial advice 
for a fee, have been held to a fiduciary standard since the passage of the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940.17  When this law was enacted, there were 
no computers, and naturally the law assumed it was addressing “individuals” 
who provide financial advice.  Over the years, countless interpretations and 
refinements of the fiduciary standard by courts and regulatory bodies have 
resulted in a fairly well-established body of law regarding what specific 
duties constitute a financial advisor’s fiduciary duty.18  Most authorities 
agree that fiduciary duty is comprised of, at minimum, a duty of care and a 
duty of loyalty.19 
 
DUTY OF CARE 
 
The duty of care requires the financial advisor to provide 
prudent recommendations to a client that: 
 
are based on appropriate and diligent research regarding the 
investments recommended and client’s personal circumstances and 
goals; 
align with the client’s level of financial sophistication; 
are appropriately and reasonably priced;  
follow customary and normal professional practices, and  
 
 17. See, 15 U.S.C. § 202(a)(11)(c) 1940 (The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires 
individuals who provide investment advice for compensation to refrain from fraud, deceptive 
practices, or material misstatements and omissions of information.); see also, Capital Gains 
Research, 375 U.S. at 282-83 (1963) (“The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a 
congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory 
relationship”); see also, Santa Fe Industries, 97 S. Ct. at 1295 (1977); Accord, Megan Jo, Are 
Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Investment Advisors Under the Investment Advisors 
Act of 1940, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2018). 
 18. See generally, Megan Jo, Are Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Investment 
Advisors Under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1549-1551 
(2018) (for an in-depth analysis on the history of fiduciary interpretations regarding financial 
advisors). 
 19. See, SEC, Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment 
Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 276, 2 (2019) https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf; see 
also Cornell Law School, Legal Information Institute, Definition of Fiduciary Duty, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty (last visited Oct. 21, 2020); see also 37 Am. 
Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 35 (2020) (“Where a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists, 
it is the duty of the person in whom the confidence is reposed to exercise the utmost good 
faith in the transaction with due regard to the interests of the one reposing confidence…(a) 
fiduciary duty is a duty of loyalty.”). 
2 - DUFFY_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2020  12:43 PM 
10 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1 
include ongoing monitoring of client accounts as appropriate 
within the scope of the client relationship.20 
 
Regarding the first two factors noted above, the duty of care includes 
doing reasonable inquiry into the client’s circumstances and objectives, so 
that the advisor can formulate appropriate advice in the client’s best 
interest.21  The advisor also needs to make a determination regarding how 
financially sophisticated the client is, and whether the client can truly 
understand the recommendations being made.22  The SEC, when providing 
guidance regarding interpretation of the duty of care, commented that this 
reasonable inquiry would include 
 
“whether the adviser is aware of events that have occurred that could 
render inaccurate or incomplete the investment profile on which the 
adviser currently bases its advice. For instance, in the case of a financial 
plan where the investment adviser also provides advice on an ongoing 
basis, a change in the relevant tax law or knowledge that the client has 
retired or experienced a change in marital status could trigger an 
obligation to make a new inquiry.”23   
 
The critical phrase in the SEC’s interpretation is whether the advisor “is aware 
of” important information which may impact the client.24  This indicates that the 
duty of care would seem to include not only a responsibility to gather information 
from the client, but to act upon any other information the advisor possesses which 
may be relevant, such as  a new tax regulation that would impact the client, or if the 
advisor notices something about the client that the client would not have otherwise 
shared.  For example, if an advisor notices a client has lost weight, appears unwell, 
and exhibits other signs of sickness, the advisor may inquire about the client’s health.  
Upon learning that the client has been diagnosed with a severe illness, the advisor 
should recommend the client update their medical documents, any powers of 
attorney, healthcare directives, and review their estate plan.  Or, upon simply asking 
“How are the kids?” the advisor may learn that the client’s son has been battling 
addiction, which may lead the advisor to recommend removing the son from a joint 
account to limit his access to cash.   
 
 20. Id. at 12-21; see also, Lorna A. Schnase, An Investment Adviser’s Fiduciary Duty, 
The Fiduciary Institute, 7 (Aug. 1, 2010), https://www.thefiduciaryinstitute.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/02/lornaschnaseFiduciary-Duty-Paper.pdf. 
 21. See SEC, Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment 
Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 276, 12-21 (2019) https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf. 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf. 
 22. See Schnase, supra note 7, at 7. 
 23. See SEC, supra note 18, at 14. 
 24. See SEC, supra note 18, at 14. 
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While failure to make small talk may not constitute a breach of fiduciary 
duty,25 many experts in the fiduciary space agree that this ability to use judgement, 
pick up on contextual clues, and ask probing questions is critical to satisfy the 
fiduciary duty.26  Clearly, an advisor is most effective as a fiduciary when he or she 
acts upon information gathered through formal and informal means, such as the 
advisor’s intuition or personal experience with the client.27  For example, attorneys, 
who also hold fiduciary status, are required to act if they notice signs of cognitive 
decline in their elderly or ailing clients.28  While financial advisors are not required 
to do the same, the passage of statutory protections for advisors who choose to act 
to protect clients upon seeing a client’s cognitive decline, such as the Senior Safe 
Act and FINRA regulations, indicate that public policy favors advisors who act upon 
their reasonably-based intuition.29  As we discuss later, with the advent of robo-
advising, one must question whether the current state of technology allows a 
computer to fulfill these kinds of duties to clients.   
The SEC has also clarified that the duty of care requires the advisor to “provide 
advice and monitoring at a frequency that is in the best interest of the client, taking 
into account the scope of the agreed relationship.” 30  The SEC provided an example 
of an advisor compensated via a periodic asset-based fee, and stated this relationship 
would require the advisor to provide extensive monitoring and advising.31  
Conversely, the SEC clarified that in a limited relationship, “such as for the 
provision of a one-time financial plan for a one-time fee”,32 the advisor would not 
likely have any ongoing monitoring responsibilities.33  From this interpretation, we 
 
 25. Under current regulatory standards, an advisor is not required to nor considered 
capable of assessing mental capacity for a client, even if signs of declining mental capacity 
are clear, although defrauding or otherwise taking advantage of a mentally diminished client 
is a clear breach of fiduciary duty.  See Schnase, supra note 7, at 15–16. 
 26. See Ji, supra note 7, at 1567. 
 27. Interestingly, while an advisor has no duty to act proactively if they see a client 
exhibiting signs of cognitive decline, many firms train advisors to spot and act upon the signs.  
See Schnase supra, note 7, at 16.  Attorneys, on the other hand, are required to report or follow 
up on signs of mental decline in their clients.  This “exercise of judgment, even if it is merely 
the incipient awareness that [‘]something is not right,[‘] is itself an assessment.” See also AM. 
BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW & AGING & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER 
ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 1 (2005). 
 28. Attorneys are required to look for signs of mental decline in their clients for two 
reasons: to determine whether clients have legal capacity to enter into a contract for services 
with the attorney, and to determine whether the client has capacity to complete the legal 
transactions that the representation may require.  See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON LAW & 
AGING & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, supra note 26. 
 29. Press Release, Sec. & Exch., SEC, NASAA, and FINRA Issue Senior Safe Act Fact 
Sheet to Help Promote Greater Reporting of Suspected Senior Financial Exploitation (May 
23, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-75. 
 30. See SEC, supra note 18, at 20–21. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 20-21. 
 33. See id. at 20-21. 
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can establish that an advisor’s fiduciary duty can be broad or limited, depending on 
the scope of the agreement.  A broad fiduciary duty would relate to more 
comprehensive and ongoing services, while a limited scope relationship would likely 
be applicable to a one-time service, or service related to specific portfolio or 
investment. 
In the next section, we note that to the extent the financial plan is confined to 
the development and recommendation of an investment portfolio (i.e., a limited 
scope engagement), we believe that a robo-advisor is capable of fulfilling this 
fiduciary duty of care.  Further, if there is an expectation of on-going investment 
monitoring, we also believe that robo-advisors are not only capable of fulfilling this 
fiduciary duty, but in some respects even better than the human advisor in doing so. 
 
DUTY OF LOYALTY 
 
The other primary duty under an advisor’s fiduciary standard is the duty of 
loyalty.34 The duty of loyalty requires an advisor to act in the best interest of the 
client by seeking out the best outcome, refraining from any self-dealing or creating 
any conflicts of interest that may harm the client, and to disclose any material and 
relevant information to the client.35  
To satisfy the duty of loyalty, an advisor must: 
 
act in the client’s best interests; 
place the client’s interests above the advisor’s own interests; and  
avoid or mitigate conflicts of interest.36 
 
The third factor, avoiding conflicts of interest, is an oft-litigated issue and is 
the one we will focus on in this discussion.  Some conflicts are clear, while others 
fall into a gray-area and the advisor must make a judgement call as to what actions 
are required to satisfy the fiduciary duty.  If an advisor cannot or chooses not to 
avoid a conflict of interest, the advisor may obtain the client’s informed consent to 
continue with the conflicted action in most cases, after providing “full and frank” 
disclosure about the conflict.37  However, the law is clear that an advisor cannot 
bypass fiduciary responsibility by simply obtaining the client’s consent for all 
conflicts, rather, an advisor must eliminate or mitigate conflicts if they are not able 
to be adequately disclosed.38  Conflicted actions may include charging clients for 
broker research that the advisor then utilizes for other clients, recommending 
investment in mutual funds managed by the advisor (which would result in the 
 
 34. See id. at 2. 
 35. See id. at 21-29. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See Schnase, supra note 7, at 11-12. 
 38. See SEC, supra note 18, at 28. 
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advisor receiving two fees from the client – the client’s advisory fee and fees charged 
by the mutual fund), and investing in the same securities as an advisor’s clients.39  
When we start applying the standard of loyalty to the world of the robo-
advisor, it is arguable that a properly programmed robo-advisor may actually be 
better at avoiding some conflicts of interest than the human advisor.  As we discuss 
below, greed, avarice, and personal bias are human characteristics that can 
potentially be deprogrammed from a robo-advice platform.  In addition, detecting 
conflicts of interest is possibly more straightforward and easier on a robo-advice 
platform, compared to a human advisor. 
 
THE EXPANSION OF FIDUCIARY LIABILITY 
 
Historically, financial professionals who did not meet the definition of an 
advisor under the Investment Advisor Act of 1940 were not held to a fiduciary 
standard.40  Rather, registered representatives who were not advisors (e,g., brokers 
working for a broker-dealer), were subject to a lesser “suitability” standard. 41  
Financial professionals who were not under the purview of securities law were held 
to a similar suitability standard or some other non-fiduciary standard.42  In recent 
years, federal regulators have taken measures to protect the public from all sources 
of low quality or harmful financial advice by advocating for a broader fiduciary 
standard that would include more individuals who provide financial advice.43  
However, these efforts have been met with vocal and powerful opposition from 
lobbying organizations, industry investment, and advisory giants.44  In 2015, the 
Department of Labor proposed a fiduciary standard for all financial professionals 
within its purview, including broker-dealers.45  The regulation was effectively killed 
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2018 for being overbroad and beyond the 
DOL’s mandate.46 
There are, however, many states and other regulatory bodies that have taken 
up the cause in the wake of the DOL’s defeat, and they have enacted or proposed 
regulations to impose a fiduciary standard across many more areas of financial 
 
 39. See Schnase, supra note 7, at 11-12. 
 40. 15 U.S.C. § 202(a)(11)(c), See Schoeff, supra note 5. 
 41. See, SEC, Commission Interpretation Regarding the Solely Incidental Prong of the 
Broker-Dealer Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Advisor, 17 C.F.R. § 276 (2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5249.pdf (FINRA is the primary regulatory body 
for anyone trading public securities, and has instituted a separate liability standard, commonly 
known as the Suitability Standard, for broker-dealers trading securities but who do not meet 
the definition of an advisor under the 1940 Act).  See also Schoeff, supra note 5. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See supra note 40. 
 44. See Schoeff, supra note 5. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Christopher Robbins, 5th Circuit Closes Book On Fiduciary Rule, FINANCIAL 
ADVISOR MAGAZINE, (June 21, 2018), https://www.fa-mag.com/news/5th-circuit-decision-
signals-end-of-dol-fiduciary-rule-39369.html. 
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practice.47  Further, even though the DOL failed to expand the reach of its coverage 
to areas such as rollover IRAs, the law regarding employer-sponsored retirement 
plans, commonly known as ERISA, still requires all individuals providing 
investment advice to an employer-funded retirement plan to adhere to a fiduciary 
standard.48  And in 2019, the CFP Board caused tsunami-sized waves in the industry 
with the announcement of an impending fiduciary standard for any individual 
holding a CFP designation.49  Recently, six states, with Massachusetts leading the 
charge, have announced plans to impose fiduciary liability for all financial 
professionals providing advice, including broker-dealers.50  Other states, like New 
Jersey, are also proposing expanded coverage of the fiduciary rule.51  And other 
regulatory agencies, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (a federal 
watchdog agency created during the Obama administration), have made similar 





EMERGENCE OF A NEW BEST INTEREST STANDARD 
 
 47. See supra note 10; see also supra note 13; see also SECRETARY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Preliminary Solicitation of Public Comments: 
Fiduciary Conduct Standard for Broker-Dealers, Agents, Investment Advisers, and 
Investment Adviser Representatives (June 14, 2019), https://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctfiduc 
iaryconductstandard/fiduciaryconductstandardidx.htm. 
 48. See Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibilities, supra note 12. 
 49. See supra note 13; see also Driving Public Policy, Our Priorities, CFP BOARD 
https://www.cfp.net/public-policy/public-policy-issues/fiduciary-standard. Like the DOL 
proposed regulation, this rule has fierce opposition, and its effective date has been delayed by 
over 1 year from the originally proposed date as the CFP Board and industry groups work 
together and clarify the regulations.  Melanie Wadell, FPA Calls for CFP Board to Delay 
Enforcement of New Ethics Standards, THINKADVISOR, (July 9, 2019, 3:21 PM) 
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2019/07/09/fpa-calls-for-cfp-board-to-delay-enforcement-of-
new-ethics-standards/; Andrew Welsch, Will Edward Jones Stop Advisors From Using the 
CFP Designation, ONWALLSTREET, (June 3, 2019, 4:15 PM), https://onwallstreet.financial-
planning.com/news/will-edward-jones-stop-advisors-from-using-the-cfp-designation. 
 50. Bruce Kelly, Morgan Stanley Threatens to Pull Out of Nevada Over State’s 
Fiduciary Rule, INVESTMENTNEWS, (Mar. 13, 4:44 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/ 
article/20190313/FREE/190319968/morgan-stanley-threatens-to-pull-out-of-nevada-over-st 
ates-fiduciary; see also SECRETARY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Preliminary 
Solicitation of Public Comments: Fiduciary Conduct Standard for Broker-Dealers, Agents, 
Investment Advisers, and Investment Adviser Representatives (June 14, 2019), https:// 
www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctfiduciaryconductstandard/fiduciaryconductstandardidx.htm. 
 51. N.J. DIV. OF CONSUMER AFF., 51 N.J.R. 493(a), Volume 51, Issue 8, (proposed Apr. 
15, 2019), https://www.njconsumeraffairs.gov/Proposals/Pages/bos-04152019-proposal.aspx 
(last visited on Oct. 21, 2020). 
 52. Lorie Konish, With Major Financial Protections on Hold, Here’s How You Can 
Guard Your Investments, CNBC, (Jan. 6, 2019 11:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/ 
04/with-consumer-protections-in-limbo-heres-how-you-can-guard-your-investments.html. 
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However, we cannot ignore that the large financial institutions and lobbying 
organizations have had some success in blocking fiduciary progress.  For nearly a 
decade, they were able to delay action on Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act.  This 
provision directed the SEC to study the need for establishing a uniform federal 
fiduciary standard of care for brokers and investment advisers providing 
personalized investment advice.53  Further, it is these organizations that led the legal 
fight against, and ultimately killed, the original attempt to impose a uniform 
fiduciary standard on financial representatives by the DOL.54  In an attempt to 
compromise with these opponents while still moving the needle towards a higher 
standard, some regulatory bodies have taken the path of “less” resistance by 
instituting what is now known as “best interest” regulations.55  These regulations 
require some groups of financial professionals to act in the client’s best interest, 
among other requirements.56  The use of the term “best interest” as something 
separate from a fiduciary standard has caused confusion in the industry, since the 
fiduciary standard has been known to mean “serving in the client’s best interest”, or 
simply, the “best interest standard.”57  Rather than adopting a uniform federal 
fiduciary standard of care for brokers and investment advisers as suggested in the 
Dodd-Frank legislation, a best interest standard that covers broker-dealers was 
adopted by the SEC in June of 2019 and is now commonly referred to as Regulation 
Best Interest (“Reg BI”).58  Reg BI imposes the best interest standard on all 
 
 53. See generally Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 
Fed. Reg. 33,318, 33,329-30 (July 12, 2019) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (“The 
Commission is adopting Regulation Best Interest pursuant to the express and broad grant of 
rulemaking authority in Section 913(f) of the Dodd-Frank Act.”). 
 54. Mark Schoeff, Jr., A Historical Timeline of Fiduciary Duty for Financial Advice, 
InvestmentNews, (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.investmentnews.com/historical-timeline-of-
fiduciary-duty-for-financial-advice-66755.; see also Bruce Kelly, Morgan Stanley Threatens 
to Pull Out of Nevada Over State’s Fiduciary Rule, INVESTMENTNEWS, (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20190313/FREE/190319968/morgan-stanley-thre 
atens-to-pull-out-of-nevada-over-states-fiduciary. 
 55. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33,318; see also New York Superintendent of Financial Services, First Amendment to 11 
NYCRR 224 (July 17, 2018), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/docs/insurance/r_finala/2018/rf187a1 
txt.pdf (Proposes to hold individuals selling or providing advice related to life insurance 
policies to a best interest standard that is similar to a fiduciary standard.). 
 56. See Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33,318; see also First Amendment to 11 NYCRR 224, supra note 53. 
 57. See Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment 
Advisers, 84 Red. Reg. 33669 (June 5, 2019) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276). 
 58. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, 84 Fed. Reg. 
33,318; see also Bradley Berman, Anna T. Pinedo, and Michael D. Russo, Regulation Best 
Interest, Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, 
(June 19, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/19/regulation-best-interest/. 
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registered representatives and broker-dealers providing investment advice, even 
those providing solely incidental advice.59   
Interestingly, the SEC defines exactly what processes and actions constitute 
meeting the best interest standard.60  While the SEC stopped short of labeling Reg 
BI a fiduciary standard, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton specified that Reg BI purposely 
drew from fiduciary principles, such as the duty to disclose material information, 
eliminate or mitigate conflicts, and make recommendations in the client’s best 
interest.61  Reg BI is more prescriptive than the fiduciary standard in that it explicitly 
outlines four requirements that must be complied with in order to satisfy the 
standard.62  Significantly, Reg BI does not require elimination of all conflicts of 
interest, but only requires written policies and procedures “reasonably designed to 
identify and at minimum disclose or eliminate conflicts of interest” (emphasis 
added).63  
Other regulatory agencies have jumped on the best interest bandwagon.  The 
state of New York recently passed the “Suitability and Best Interests in Life 
Insurance and Annuity Transactions” regulation, otherwise known as “Reg 187.”64  
Reg 187 requires individuals making recommendations regarding the sale of or 
transactions related to life insurance policies or annuities to act in the consumer’s 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. James Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Regulation Best Interest and The Investment 
Adviser Fiduciary Duty: Two Strong Standards That Protect and Provide Choice for Main 
Street Investors, (July 8, 2019) (Reg BI requires satisfaction of four requirements: disclosure, 
care, conflict of interest, and compliance.) 
 61. Id. (Reg. BI imposes a best interest standard upon broker-dealers that is higher than 
the current suitability standard, and draws from fiduciary principles which require the broker-
dealer to act in the best interests of their clients.). 
 62. Hester M. Pierce, Commissioner, SEC, What’s in a Name? Regulation Best Interest 
v. Fiduciary, (July 24, 2018) (“[T]he best interest obligation shall be satisfied if: (i) the broker-
dealer reasonably discloses to the retail customer … the material facts relating to the scope 
and terms of the relationship with the retail customer and all material conflicts of interest that 
are associated with the recommendation; (ii) the broker-dealer, in making the 
recommendation, exercises reasonable diligence, care, skill, and prudence; (iii) the broker-
dealer establishes, maintains, and enforces written policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to identify and at a minimum disclose, or eliminate, all material conflicts of interest 
that are associated with such recommendations; and (iv) the broker-dealer establishes, 
maintains, and enforces written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and 
disclose and mitigate, or eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from financial 
incentives associated with such recommendations.”). 
 63. Id. (Under Reg BI, the broker-dealer must establish, maintains, and enforce “written 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and disclose and mitigate, or 
eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from financial incentives associated with such 
recommendations.”), (citing proposed rule 15l-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(17 CFR 240.15L-1) (emphasis added).   
 64. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, § 224 (2019). 
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best interest.65  Like Reg BI, Reg 187 is very prescriptive in setting forth 
requirements for meeting this standard.66  Further, Reg 187 also sounds very much 
like a fiduciary standard by requiring the individual making the recommendation to 
act in the client’s best interests, act with due care, ensure the recommendation is 
suitable, and ensure the client is aware of any conflicts of interest.67 
As we noted earlier, the term “best interest” is routinely used at common law 
to describe the fiduciary requirements of loyalty and fairness.  To imply in the 
regulatory world that “best interest” and “fiduciary” aren’t commonly understood to 
be the same standard creates confusion for the parties subject to the regulation, and 
will create difficulty for courts to interpret these terms differently.  This begs the 
question – are the two standards really that different?  When addressing the best 
interest vs. fiduciary issue, SEC Commissioner Hester Pierce downplays the tension 
created by the terms’ similarity68 and instead encourages financial professionals and 
clients to focus on the substance of the services rendered to determine whether the 
best interest standard has been met.69  Although Commissioner Pierce glosses over 
the weight of the terms used, she is one of the few individuals who has ventured to 
clarify how the best interest and fiduciary standards actually differ.  She notes that 
there are two substantive differences between the two standards – first, the fiduciary 
standard requires the fiduciary to provide ongoing and continuous advice as 
appropriate, while the best interest standard may only apply to circumstances at a 
point in time; and second, the best interest standards have slightly different 
restrictions regarding conflicts of interest.70  While this is helpful commentary, this 
distinction lacks real substance.  As we noted earlier, the fiduciary duty to 
continuously monitor client accounts can be limited by reducing the scope of the 
engagement.71  While the best interest standards are more prescriptive regarding 
conflicts of interest, the final Reg BI wording clearly states that the regulation aims 
 
 65. Id.; see also Peter Molinaro, Esq., REGULATION 187 NEW YORK’S BEST INTEREST 
STANDARD, NAIFA-NYS (2019), https://naifanys.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Power 
PointReg187.pdf. 
 66. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 11, §§ 224-226 (2019); see also Peter Molinaro, 
Esq., REGULATION 187 NEW YORK’S BEST INTEREST STANDARD, NAIFA-NYS (2019), https:// 
naifanys.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/PowerPointReg187.pdf. 
 67. Id. 
 68. H Pierce, supra note 60. 
 69. Id. (“We—as regulators—and you—as advisers and brokers—ought to make an 
effort to encourage investors to look beyond nice terms to the substance of what their financial 
professional is doing . . . .”). 
 70. Id. (“[O]nly two differences stand out.  First, an adviser generally has an ongoing 
duty to monitor over the course of its relationship with its client, while a broker-dealer 
generally does not.  Second, a broker-dealer must either mitigate or eliminate any material 
financial conflict of interest it may have with its client.”). 
 71. See Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment 
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. IA-5325 (July 12, 2019), https:// 
www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf.  
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to identify and “disclose OR eliminate” conflicts.72  The ultimate result is the same 
as the fiduciary standard, which allows an advisor to continue with a conflict as long 
as it is properly disclosed to a client.73  Reg BI appears to be, simply, the fiduciary 
standard in a convenient checklist format.  We all know the phrase “if it looks like a 
duck, walks like a duck, and sounds like a duck, then it’s probably a duck.”  While 
the best interest standard may not be the same species as a fiduciary duck, it is 
certainly within the same genus.   
The parsing of words such as “best interest” and “fiduciary” are not just 
interesting issues that may or may not come up in future litigation.  These issues are 
applicable now because they can often overlap.  Consider this example.  A New 
York representative of a financial service company is licensed as a life insurance 
agent and as a registered representative of her company’s broker-dealer.  She has 
earned her CFP designation as well.  Say she sells a client a variable annuity.  What 
is required of her to fulfill her regulatory duties under these new rules?  New York’s 
new Reg. 187 subjects her and her insurance company to a best interest standard, 
and she is expected to provide certain documentation under this regulation.  The 
variable annuity is a security and consequently, she is also subject to the SEC’s new 
Reg BI.  Although both of these regulations require her to act in her client’s best 
interest, they use different methodologies and have different expectations for how 
she must demonstrate compliance.  Further, in one case, her insurance company must  
take certain actions to assure her compliance, but because the product is a security, 
her broker-dealer is also expected to have specific procedures.  And, what about her 
requirements as a CFP?  To maintain her designation, she is to be measured as a 
fiduciary.  Assume something goes wrong with the sale, and her client wants to file 
a complaint.  Is the representative’s actions to be measured by the best interest 
standards of two different regulators plus the fiduciary standard of a disciplinary 
board?  If a civil suit comes from the alleged wrong, will she be judged by the highest 
of the three different standards?  Or will she be subjected to yet a fourth standard – 
New York’s common law concerning insurance agents?  While there is no easy 
answer, this example shows that the issues are front and center.   
This review of the fiduciary and best interest regulations shows that the over-
arching strategy for regulators is to include more and more of the financial services 
landscape under a fiduciary-type umbrella.  But how does this increase in fiduciary 
responsibility apply when the advisor is binary rather than DNA-based?  In the next 




 72. See supra note 60. (Under Reg BI, the broker-dealer must establish, maintains, and 
enforce “written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and disclose and 
mitigate, or eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from financial incentives 
associated with such recommendations.”), (citing proposed rule 15l-1 under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (17 CFR 240.15L-1) (emphasis added). 
 73. See SEC Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment 
Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 276.2.C (2019). 
2 - DUFFY_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2020  12:43 PM 
Winter 2021] YOU SAY FIDUCIARY, I SAY BINARY 19 
ROBO-ADVISORS AND LIABILITY STANDARDS 
 
In recent years, robo-advisors have exploded in popularity.  The Aite Group 
estimates that assets on digital investment management platforms was around US 
$257 billion at the end of 2018, and that client assets under management on robo-
advice platforms will reach US $1.26 trillion by 2023.74  This is largely because 
robo-advised services are typically offered at a lower cost compared to a human 
advisor, making advisor services more accessible to a broader population.75  In 
addition, robo-advisors are arguably more effective than human advisors at some 
services, such as continual monitoring and rebalancing of client accounts.76  This 
model theoretically frees up human advisors to focus on more financially complex 
client services, which require a stronger advisor-client relationship and specialized 
attention.77  As financial advising technology evolves alongside an evolving liability 
landscape, we must consider how and if pure robo-advisors can meet the applicable 
liability standard.  In this section, we first discuss what liability standard would apply 
to robo-advisors, then whether robo-advisors can meet this standard.   
 
CAN A ROBO-ADVISOR MEET THE FIDUCIARY STANDARD? 
 
As we discussed in Section II, advisors covered under the Investment Advisor 
Act of 1940 are held to a fiduciary standard.  There is much regulatory and judicial 
support for defining robo-advisors as advisors under the Act, and therefore to hold 
them to a fiduciary standard.  The definitive answer came from the SEC, who 
determined that robo-advisors meeting the definition of an advisor under the 
Investment Advisor Act of 1940 are considered registered investment advisers 
(RIAs).78  Therefore, the SEC holds these robo-advisors to a fiduciary standard, as 
 
 74. Alois Pirker, US Digital Investment Management Market Monitor, Q2 2019, Report 
Summary, Aite Group, (May 22, 2019), https://www.aitegroup.com/report/us-digital-invest 
ment-management-market-monitor-q2-2019.  
 75. See Cheng, supra note 1. (“Because artificial intelligence replaces human 
intervention almost entirely, costs for these kinds of services are reduced to a minimum. This 
has opened the door to the world of investment for people that can’t afford a financial advisor 
made of flesh and bones—the key to the success of robo-advisors, especially in the United 
States.”). 
 76. Barbara Friedberg, What Robo-Advisors Can Do Better (and Worse) than Financial 
Advisors, The Balance, (June 25, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/what-robo-advisors-do-
better-than-financial-advisors-4154903. 
 77. See Cheng, supra note 1. (“Still … (w)hat seems to remain a very important success 
factor in the financial advisory business is personalization.  People have emotions and 
insecurities that need to be addressed, a quality that no machine can yet provide.”). 
 78. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (Feb. 23, 
2017) https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_robo-advisers.html.  (“Although 
the services that they provide are automated, robo-advisers in the U.S. must comply with the 
securities laws applicable to SEC or state-registered investment advisers.”). 
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are all other RIAs.79  The SEC has published additional guidance specifically for 
robo-advisors that may assist them in meeting this fiduciary standard.80  This 
guidance focused heavily on the development and testing of the algorithms that 
power the robo-advisor.81  In addition, though sparse, case law and rulings support 
holding robo-advisors to a fiduciary standard.82   
Although it’s clear that robo-advisors can be held to a fiduciary standard, 
whether or not a “pure” robo-advisor (that is, one that lacks any human advising 
component) can actually meet the standard requires more analysis.  This analysis 
will suggest that pure robo-advisors are indeed capable of being fiduciaries when 
they are being engaged for limited services such as the creation and monitoring of 
an investment portfolio.  When the service involves broad scale on-going financial 
planning, the ability of a pure robo-advisor to successfully act as a fiduciary is more 
questionable.  We will begin by discussing the duties of care and loyalty in a pure 
robo-advising context. 
 
DUTY OF CARE 
 
Recall that the duty of care requires the advisor to make prudent 
recommendations based on the client’s needs, goals, and appropriate research, and 
requires the advisor to provide ongoing monitoring within the scope of the client 
agreement.83  Significant debate centers around the robo-advisor’s ability to meet 
the prudent recommendation requirement.  In the following sections, we discuss the 
ability of robo-advice in meeting the prudent recommendation requirement in more 
depth. 
First, we discuss the deficiencies of the robo-advisor questionnaire and the 
inability of the robo-advisor to proactively seek out information.  Next, we discuss 
the inability of the robo-advisor to utilize human judgement.  Finally, we address the 
arguments that highlight how a robo-advisor can meet the fiduciary standard, in 





 79. The SEC has successfully litigated against 2 robo-advisors for violating the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940.  See SEC Charges Two Robo-Advisors With False 
Disclosures, Securities and Exchange Commission, (Dec. 21, 2018) https://www.sec. 
gov/news/press-release/2018-300. 
 80. Guidance Update, DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION at 1 (Feb. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-
2017-02.pdf. 
 81. Id. at 3-4. 
 82. Sergeants Benevolent Ass’n Annuity Fund; AXA Rosenberg Group, LLC, S.E.C. 
No. 3-14224 (2011). 
 83. See supra note 18, at 10-20. 
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Robo-Advisors Cannot Make Prudent Recommendations Because the 
Questionnaire is too Limited 
 
The insufficiency of the questionnaire the robo-advisor uses to gather 
information about the client and formulate a recommendation is at the core of the 
robo-advisor’s inability to meet the duty of care.  First, there is no generally accepted 
standard for these questionnaires.  Second, many robo-questionnaires are too limited 
in scope and do not allow the client to ask questions, which results in incomplete 
information upon which the robo-advisor builds the investment recommendations 
and an inability.  Third, the advice recommended by the robo-advisor is not 
personalized to each individual client.   
 
Robo-Advice Questionnaires May Not Be Effective 
 
Questionnaires vary widely in terms of length, question type, question topic, 
and the like.84  While some questionnaires inquire broadly about the client’s personal 
circumstances, risk tolerance, and investment horizon, others may ask questions that 
are more limited and based on a certain outcome.85  In a Joint Investor Alert on 
Automated Advice issued by the SEC and FINRA, the agencies cautioned that 
questions on the survey can be “over-generalized, ambiguous, [or] misleading[.]”86  
There is no consistency or industry-wide best practice to differentiate a good 
questionnaire from a poorly constructed one.  In addition, the robo-advisor has no 
way of confirming through supporting documentation if the information provided is 
accurate,87 and may not be programmed to spot inconsistent answers and ask the 
client clarifying questions.88  Simply stated, the challenge with questionnaires is the 
old adage “garbage in; garbage out.”   
 
Robo-Advice is Based on Limited Data  
 
Since the data is limited only to the specific questions asked, the universe of 
information upon which the robo-advisor generates recommendations is quite 
limited.  If questionnaires fail to gather sufficient or accurate information, there is a 
high likelihood that the advice provided will not meet the duty of care.  Vital 
 
 84. FINRA, Report on Digital Investment Advice at 8 (Mar. 2016), https://www. 
finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf; see also Investor Bulletin: 
Robo-Advisers, supra note 76, at 6.  
 85. Guidance Update, supra note 78, at 6. 
 86. Investor Alert: Automated Investment Tools, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (May 8, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/autolistingto 
olshtm.html. 
 87. Mass. Sec. Div., Policy Statement, Robo-Advisers and State Investment Adviser 
Registration at 5 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/Policy-Statement—
Robo-Advisers-and-State-Investment-Adviser-Registration.pdf. 
 88. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 
supra note 18, at 6-7. 
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information can be easily missed.89 In addition, the robo-advisor cannot seek out 
information that exists outside of the questionnaire, and this prevents the robo-
advisor from obtaining crucial information about the client.  While a human advisor 
can ask follow up questions, probe deeper into a topic if necessary, or ask for 
background information and context, many questionnaires do not seek out 
supplementary information or allow a client to provide more detail.90  Sometimes in 
the course of doing a financial plan, the planner may unearth a new question whose 
answer is impactful on the ultimate recommendation.  Law Professor Arthur Laby 
also notes that humans cannot share anticipated events with the robo-advisor.91  This 
inability to proactively seek out or act upon more information is a major roadblock 
to providing truly prudent advice.92   
A related aspect to the limitations of the questionnaire is that the questionnaires 
do not allow the client to ask questions, and the robo-advisor cannot discern whether 
the client understands the questions being asked or what is being recommended.93  
One industry expert, Scott MacKillop, wrote 
 
Then there is the problem of properly identifying a client’s goals. 
What if a client isn’t really sure about her goals or has a problem 
articulating her goals? What if a client has multiple goals? What if the 
client has conflicting goals? What if there’s a gap between an investor’s 
tolerance for risk and the amount of risk he needs to take to reach his goal? 
What if the investor simply doesn’t understand some of the 10 or 15 
questions on the questionnaire? What if they think they understand the 
questions, but really don’t? 94 
 
If a client cannot ask questions, they may not understand what is being asked, 
and they are more likely to respond incorrectly, which will lead to lower quality or 
improper advice, thus failing the prudent recommendation requirement.   
 
Robo-Advisors Cannot Make Personalized Recommendations  
 
Many experts argue robo-advisors cannot make prudent recommendations 
because they are designed to generate advice based on a pre-determined customer 
 
 89. Ji, supra note 7, at 1543. 
 90. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 
supra note 18, at 6.  
 91. Tara Siegel Bernard, The Pros and Cons of Using a Robot As An Investment Adviser, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/your-money/the-pros-
and-cons-of-using-a-robot-as-an-investment-adviser.html. 
 92. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 
supra note 18, at 6.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Scott MacKillop, Can A Robot Be A Fiduciary?, THINKADVISOR (Jan. 30, 2017, 7:00 
PM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2017/01/30/can-a-robot-be-a-fiduciary/. 
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profile that is determined by answers to a limited questionnaire.95  When clients 
respond to the questionnaires on a robo-advisor platform, the robo-advisor assigns 
the client a pre-determined profile which should reflect the client’s appetite for risk, 
goals, investment preferences, etc.  Advice is then generated that should presumably 
match the client’s profile characteristics.  In FINRA’s Report on Digital Investment 
Advice, it noted: 
 
Many of these tools match investors to a pre-packaged portfolio of 
securities based on their profile, i.e., investors with a conservative profile 
are placed in a conservative investment portfolio and investors with an 
aggressive profile are placed in an aggressive portfolio.96 
 
However, in a study conducted by FINRA, they found that robo-advisors only 
have an average of five to eight different customer profiles into which they 
categorize thousands of clients.97  It is hard to imagine that these limited profiles are 
truly representative of each client’s individualized needs and goals, which is not 
aligned with the prudent recommendation standard to consider each client’s 
individual circumstances.98  In fact, the word “fiduciary” was interpreted by the 
Supreme Court into the Investment Advisor Act of 1940 specifically because the 
court recognized that investment advice should be “personalized” and because of the 
highly personal nature of the advisor-client relationship.99  A robo-advisor, however, 
is simply not designed to deliver personal advice.   
 
Robo-Advisors Cannot Make Prudent Recommendations Because They Lack 
Human Judgement  
 
Another argument raised by many experts against a robo-advisor’s ability to 
make prudent recommendations is the absence of human judgment.  This is a tricky 
argument because there is no explicit regulation or judicial interpretation that 
requires an advisor to utilize human judgment to satisfy fiduciary duty.100  However, 
many experts in this space argue that human judgment is critical because it allows 
 
 95. Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, (Feb. 
23, 2017) https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_robo-advisers.html (“A robo-
adviser uses information you provide to create a recommendation.  As a result, a robo-
adviser’s recommendation is limited by the information it requests and receives from you, 
typically through an online questionnaire.  It is important to keep in mind that some robo-
advisers may obtain and consider only limited information about you.”); see also Guidance 
Update, supra note 78, at 6. 
 96. Report on Digital Investment Advice, supra note 82, at 6. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 13-14 (July 12, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf. 
 99. Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. at 191 (1963). 
 100. Ji, supra note 7, at 1570. 
2 - DUFFY_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/2020  12:43 PM 
24 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1 
advisors to gather more information about a client that is critical to make prudent 
recommendations.  Compare scenarios where a couple uses a robo-advisor compared 
to a human advisor to set up a brokerage investment account with both spouses on 
the account.  The human advisor may notice that the wife seems uncomfortable or 
angry during the meeting.  The human advisor may probe deeper to uncover the 
source of this discomfort and may learn that the husband has significant creditor 
issues and a gambling problem.  The advisor can then advise how to protect the 
assets in the account from the husband’s creditors, which is clearly in both spouse’s 
best interests.  A robo-advisor would not have picked up on those cues. It is clear 
that human judgment is a valuable tool for an advisor to act in their clients’ best 
interests.  
As we noted, statutory authority does not explicitly require human judgment 
to meet the fiduciary standard.  Perhaps the reason is as simple as former SEC 
Commissioner Kara M. Stein stated, “the concept [of robo-advisors] did not even 
exist when most of the laws applicable to investment advisers were drafted.  Most 
of these laws are based on the idea of a human investment adviser on the other end 
of the phone or sitting across the table from you.”101  Human judgment was not 
explicitly written into the duty of care because it was assumed that humans would 
always be the advisor, and using human judgment is a natural human trait that did 
not need to be specified.  
 
When Can a Robo-Advisor Make Prudent Recommendations? 
 
Robo-advisor proponents have responded to these concerns about a  
robo-advisor’s ability to meet the prudent recommendation standard with many 
effective arguments.  These proponents argue robo-advisors can make prudent 
recommendations in limited scope engagements and could even surpass the abilities 
of a human advisor.  In a white paper issued by Morgan-Lewis, their experts draw 
from trustee fiduciary principles to argue that robo-advisors can satisfy the duty of 
care, as long as the engagement is limited in scope.102  In a limited engagement, a 
much more effective questionnaire can be crafted which addresses all relevant data, 
and therefore the robo-advisor can effectively make prudent recommendations.103  
In addition, limited scope engagements are extremely popular and are a commonly 
 
 101. Kara M. Stein, SEC Commissioner, Surfing the Wave: Technology, Innovation, and 
Competition - Remarks at Harvard Law School’s Fidelity Guest Lecture Series (Nov. 9, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/surfing-wave-technology-innovation-and-competit 
ion-remarks-harvard-law-schools-fidelity. 
 102. Jennifer L. Klass & Eric Perelman, The Evolution of Advice: Digital Investment 




 103. Id. at 2, 6-8, 16. 
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accepted practice. 104  However, Morgan-Lewis ignores that these limited 
engagements are typically based upon the client’s needs and desires; they are not 
designed as a workaround to circumvent the deficiencies of the advisor. In addition, 
some experts take issue with this approach as a panacea to the fiduciary issue and 
argue that this scope limitation undermines the true intent of a fiduciary standard.105  
Scott MacKillop argues that  
Being a fiduciary comes along with important obligations and duties to the 
client. You cannot maintain that you are a fiduciary while disclaiming all the 
responsibilities that go along with that title.106 
The Morgan Lewis experts remained silent regarding whether a robo-advisor 
could meet the standard in a broader, comprehensive advising context. 107  In general, 
however, it appears that robo-advisors are quite capable of fulfilling fiduciary 
responsibilities in situations where there is a limited scope engagement. 
An additional argument is that a robo-advisor may be more effective at making 
prudent recommendations than a human advisor. The most glaring benefit of a robo-
advisor is the sophistication of the machine’s ability to evaluate limitless data and 
risk scenarios to develop an ideal efficient frontier investment portfolio.  In days of 
yore, before the use of computers for financial analysis, financial advisors would 
manually develop these portfolio calculations, which were naturally based on less 
robust data and prone to human error.  The advancement of computer technology 
has allowed for increasingly faster processing of calculations.  In the area of 
investment portfolio design this has allowed for more effective modeling, and 
computers can outperform humans in this area at a quantum scale.  Before 
computers, Monte Carlo simulations required a significant amount of time and were 
functionally unavailable for individual portfolio design. With the advent of the PC 
and faster processing chips, stochastic modelling is a normal aspect of investment 
portfolio design.  Thus, with a carefully crafted fact finder that dives deeply into the 
transaction defined by the limited engagement, a robo-advisor can create a more 
informed investment portfolio than a human advisor.   
In addition, recall that “(f)iduciary duty requires the advisor to update 
information periodically so that [their advice] can be adjusted to changing 
circumstances.”108  A robo-advisor could theoretically be programmed to gather data 
from a potentially unlimited number of sources: global markets, regulatory changes, 
industry news related to the client’s business, the local economy, even news about 
the client’s competitors, and instantly make adjustments to the client’s portfolio or 
identify areas of risk.  It is unlikely a human advisor would have the time or 
capability to keep abreast of all of these data sources.  In this way, a robo-advisor 
 
 104. Id. at 7-8. 
 105. See MacKillop, supra note 92. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Klass, supra note 100. 
 108. Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers; Custodial 
Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, 59 Fed. Reg 13, 465 (proposed Mar. 22, 
1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). 
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can satisfy the ongoing monitoring requirement much more effectively and cheaply 
than a human advisor.  While a human can only monitor an account periodically, a 
robo-advisor can continually monitor and adjust an account to maximize 
effectiveness.  There is little risk that a robo-advisor, unless improperly 
programmed,109 will miss an opportunity to rebalance, take advantage of a tax loss 
harvesting opportunity, or adjust investments in a timely manner.   
 
DUTY OF LOYALTY 
 
As we noted earlier, the duty of loyalty requires an advisor to act in the client’s 
best interests, place the client’s interests above the advisor’s own interests, and avoid 
or mitigate conflicts of interest through “full and fair” disclosure of material 
information and to avoid misleading clients. 110  Robo-advisors can satisfy the duty 
of loyalty to a greater degree in some ways, such as eliminating advisor conflicts of 
interest, and ensuring sufficient disclosures are provided. But significant issues 
remain with regards to firm-level conflicts of interest and effectiveness of 
disclosures. In fact, the technological complexity of robo-advisors may cause these 
issues to be exacerbated and have a greater negative impact on the client population. 
 
Robo-Advisors are Not Necessarily Free from Conflicts of Interest 
 
Much of the support for robo-advisors comes from the idea that because robo-
advisors are not susceptible to human biases or motivations, conflicts of interest can 
be eliminated.111  While this may be correct, it only addresses the conflicts that arise 
directly between the advisor and the client.  Conflicts at the firm-level, which are 
conflicts that arise due to the institution’s practices, policies, or procedures, are not 
eliminated with the use of robo-advisors.  In fact, robo-advisors can be, and often 
are, intentionally programmed to favor the institution by making recommendations 
that favor the institution’s products, rebalance client portfolios in ways which will 
allow the institution to earn more fees, and otherwise make recommendations that 
benefit the firm.112   
For example, Schwab’s robo-advisor, SIP, was programmed to allocate 
between seven and thirty percent of every client’s portfolio into cash, which was 
then invested by Schwab.  Schwab earned significant revenue through this practice, 
but this was clearly not in the best interests of the clients, because while Schwab 
paid the client nominal interest on the cash deposits, the cash could have been 
invested more effectively and could have yielded much higher returns for the 
 
 109. SEC Charges Two Robo-Advisors With False Disclosures, SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-300. 
 110. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Commission Interpretation Regarding 
Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 276, 12-21 (2019), https:// 
www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2019/ia-5248.pdf. 
 111. See Ji, supra note 7, at 1572. 
 112. See id. at 1572-73. 
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client.113  Schwab was forced to amend this practice so that the client is treated more 
favorably, however practices like these are commonplace among all advisory 
firms.114  And now, with the Schwab’s acquisition of TD Ameritrade, a new issue 
arises with their robo platform.  It has been suggested that he migration of TD 
Ameritrade digital advice clients into the Schwab fold would amount to a conflict of 
interest.115  In fact, the impact of firm conflicts like the one above are arguably more 
detrimental than personal conflicts between an advisor and client because the 
number of clients impacted by the firm conflict is potentially exponentially higher.  
There is a counter argument to this challenge.  While conflicts can occur within 
a robo-advisor environment, these conflicts of interest are more readily detected 
because the conflict of interest in a robo-advisor originates from inappropriate 
program design.  Whether innocently or nefariously created, the conflict is “hard 
wired” into the robo-advisor’s recommendation.  To the extent this violates the 
fiduciary duty of loyalty, it violates it for all clients in the same circumstances.  Once 
discovered, it can be exposed and stopped.  Robo-advising doesn’t prevent negligent 
or fraudulent design, but it makes it easier to detect. 
 
Robo-Advisor Disclosures Are Potentially Too Complex for Consumers to 
Understand 
 
A second issue to discuss regarding robo-advisors meeting the duty of loyalty 
is the disclosure requirement.  As we noted above, advisors must disclose any 
information that is material or that denotes a conflict of interest.  In some ways, robo-
advisors can provide disclosures more effectively than human advisors.  Robo-
advisor disclosures will always be consistent and complete.  There is no risk that a 
robo-advisor will “forget” or intentionally fail to disclose an important fact, or that 
some clients will receive a different explanation of the disclosures than others.  In 
fact, a robo-advisor can even utilize technology to emphasize specific information 
in the disclosures, such as putting some information in pop-up boxes, requiring the 
client to click “I Agree”, or highlighting critical text.116   
However, the effectiveness of a robo-advisor in providing disclosures is 
limited in two ways.  First, there is no opportunity for the client to ask follow up 
questions, or no opportunity for the robo-advisor to discern if the client truly 
understands the disclosures through facial expressions or context.117  Although the 
SEC explicitly states that an advisor is not required to ensure a client understands 
the disclosures, it does clarify that “it would not be consistent with an adviser’s 
fiduciary duty to infer or accept client consent where the adviser was aware, or 
 
 113. See id. at 1575. 
 114. See id. at 1575-76. 
 115. Samuel Steinberger, A Curious Consequence of Robo Integration, 
WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.wealthmanagement.com/techn 
ology/curious-consequence-robo-integration. 
 116. Guidance Update, supra note 78, at 5-6. 
 117. Id. 
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reasonably should have been aware, that the client did not understand the nature and 
import of the conflict.”118  The robo-advisor would be unable to rephrase or better 
explain the information when a client fails to understand the disclosure. Second, as 
we noted above, firm conflicts arise from a robo-advisor’s programming.  While best 
practices, regulatory guidance, and case law all require disclosures to be prominent, 
easy to read and understand, and written in plain language,119 the complexity of a 
disclosure increases significantly when technology is implicated.  One scholar notes 
 
…[S]ubstantial, and substantially complex, information that is 
pushed out to consumers via disclosure is not accompanied by any test to 
determine whether it is understood or appropriately used. Roboadvisers 
add an additional level of complexity to disclosure as a device.”120   
 
In addition to the normal and traditional disclosures, the SEC’s guidance for 
robo-advisors, focuses heavily on the algorithms used to power the robo-advising 
platform.121  The SEC recommends describing the algorithm’s design, how it will be 
used, and what risks are posed by the algorithm’s design.122  The SEC requires that, 
in cases where conflicts are so complex that they cannot be disclosed clearly and 
specifically enough for a client to truly understand a conflict, the conflict should be 
either eliminated or “adequately mitigate(d), (i.e., modify practices to reduce [the 
conflict]).”123  Since research shows that most clients don’t understand complex 
disclosures anyway,124 it stands to reason that disclosures regarding software 
program design and algorithms would be even less comprehensible to retail 
consumers, rendering the disclosures moot.125  In addition, while the SEC guidance 
is helpful, the scope of these disclosures is left unaddressed.  As experts from 
Morgan Lewis note, an advisor may use “hundreds” of algorithms, with each having 
 
 118. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 
supra note 18, at 13-14; Susanna Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure 
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 
139, 146 (2006) (“In order for a disclosure system to be effective, not only must the 
information that is supplied be disclosed completely, clearly, and accurately, but it must also 
be read and comprehended by the consumer.”). 
 119. Guidance Update, supra note 78, at 3. 
 120. Nicole G. Iannarone, Rethinking Automated Investment Adviser Disclosure, 50 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 433, 440 (2019). 
 121. Guidance Update, supra note 78, at 6. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers, 
supra note 18, at 34-35. 
 124. Iannarone, supra note 118, at 440 (“Consumers are overwhelmed by the sheer 
amount of information disclosed.”).  See also Ripken, supra note 116, at 146-47 
(“[D]isclosure that is too long or complex to be comprehensible to the average person floods 
the individual with too much nonessential data and overloads the person with information that 
inhibits optimal decision-making.”). 
 125. Anita K. Krug, Downstream Securities Regulations, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1589, 1647 
(2014) (regulation should be tailored based on the needs of the client). 
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its own set of assumptions, risks, limitations, and conflicts.126  Morgan Lewis 
contends that it would not be reasonable to provide full disclosures about each, and 
that the firm should disclose only what it deems material to making the 
recommendation.127 
These challenges suggest that the robo-advisor is not a panacea for the ills that 
can arise when there is a fiduciary relationship between a client and the advisor.  But, 
just as humans are capable of acting as a fiduciary, so too can a robo-advisor meet 
the fiduciary standard in the right situation.  However, current technology suggests 
this standard is best met under limited circumstances.  First, when the engagement 
is limited in scope, such as investment advice, the robo-advisor has design and 
monitoring abilities often superior to human capabilities. Second, when the creators 
of the advisor are themselves free of conflicts of interest, the robo-advisor offers a 
systematic means of delivering conflict-free advice.  Finally, the robo-advice must 
be delivered with an eye towards clarity and simplicity rather than relying on 
disclosures and disclaimers.  Specifically, when the nature of the recommendation 
is investment-based, the expectation is that the pure robo-advisor can be the client’s 
investment advisor within the current regulatory regime.  The recent proliferation of 
robo-advisors in the securities industry is empirical evidence of the validity of this 
proposition. 
 
CAN A ROBO-ADVISOR MEET THE BEST INTEREST STANDARD? 
 
Because the ability of a robo-advisor to meet the fiduciary standard is far from 
a settled matter, it would behoove us to consider whether robo-advisors can meet the 
new entrant to the liability field, the best interest standard.  As we noted above, the 
SEC declined to provide a definition for Best Interest, but instead chose a 
prescriptive approach which detailed specific actions which, if complied with, would 
generally satisfy the Best Interest standard.128  The Reg BI rule has four basic 
requirements: a disclosure obligation, care obligation, conflict of interest obligation, 
and compliance obligation.129  The compliance obligation requires a broker-dealer 
to maintain and enforce policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to 
achieve compliance with Reg BI.130  This obligation is largely procedural and we 
believe it could be satisfied in a robo-advisor context, so we will not discuss it at 
length here. 
The disclosure obligation and care obligation are very similar to these duties 
under the fiduciary standard.  In fact, the SEC has been clear that it drew heavily 
 
 126. Steven W. Stone et al., SEC Weighs in on Robo-Advisers: Disclosure, Suitability, 
and Compliance Obligations, MORGAN LEWIS (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.morganlewis. 
com/pubs/sec-weighs-in-on-robo-advisers-disclosure-suitability-and-compliance-obligations. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, Release No. 36-
86031, 83 Fed. Reg. 21574, 54 (June 5, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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from fiduciary principles when drafting Reg BI.131  In our view, the same concerns 
exist with a robo-advisor’s ability to satisfy the duty of care and disclosure 
obligations under Reg BI as we noted above, but with one important exception.  
Recall that at least one expert opined that one of the substantive differences between 
Regulation BI and fiduciary duty was that a fiduciary has a duty to provide ongoing 
monitoring of a client’s accounts, unless the scope of the client-advisor agreement 
was otherwise defined.132  Regulation BI does not require ongoing monitoring.  As 
we noted above, a robo-advisor would be well-suited to provide ongoing investment 
monitoring, even to a greater degree than an advisor.  Therefore, a robo-advisor 
would likely satisfy the monitoring requirement with no issue because it is already 
able to perform monitoring at the fiduciary level.  
With regards to the conflict of interest obligation, Reg BI explicitly addresses 
the firm conflict issue described above.133  Under this obligation, the broker-dealer 
must prevent any material limitations on offerings, such as making 
recommendations only for proprietary products, from causing the financial 
professional to act in their own best interests.134  This means that broker-dealers can 
offer limited or proprietary recommendations, but the advisor cannot personally 
receive an incentive for doing so.  In other words, the advisor cannot make more 
money from recommending a proprietary product compared to a non-proprietary 
product.135  Because the firm conflicts are clearly addressed, and personal 
motivations are not an issue, we believe robo-advisors can satisfy the conflict of 




So, where does all of this statutory analysis this leave us?  Robo-advisors are 
a critical part of the financial advising landscape, and will only continue to grow.  
The financial industry needs clarification on when and how robo-advisors will fit in 
with, and enhance, the providing of financial advice.  As we have shown, robo-
advisors meet the best interest standard, and in specific contexts, robo-advisors can 
meet the fiduciary standard to an even greater extent than human advisors.  Rather 
than fight the tide of robo-advising by questioning its ability to mimic human 
 
 131. Id. at 1-2. 
 132. Pierce, supra note 60.  (“[O]nly two differences stand out.  First, an adviser generally 
has an ongoing duty to monitor over the course of its relationship with its client, while a 
broker-dealer generally does not.  Second, a broker-dealer must either mitigate or eliminate 
any material financial conflict of interest it may have with its client.”). 
 133. Id. (“written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and disclose 
and mitigate, or eliminate, material conflicts of interest arising from financial incentives 
associated with such recommendations.”). 
 134. Regulation Best Interest: The Broker-Dealer Standard of Conduct, Release No. 36-
86031, 83 Fed. Reg. 21574, 15 (June 5, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 135. Id. 
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behaviors, we should support the use of robo-advice where and when it outshines its 
human colleagues. 
We propose a new federal law specific to robo-advisors that highlights and 
supports the use of robo-advice in these specific contexts, while prohibiting pure 
robo-advice in the areas where its ability to meet the fiduciary standard is less clear.  
The statute should identify where robo-advisors are best used and should specify 
where human advisors must be utilized.  Recall that the strengths of a robo-advisor 
are providing investment advice related to a limited-scope engagement, and 
continual monitoring and rebalancing of that specific account.  Robo-advisors are 
then best suited for making portfolio recommendations related to specific assets, and 
monitoring, rebalancing and adjusting these accounts as necessary. 
For any services that require more than this, a human advisor or a hybrid model 
should be required.  As we noted above, a robo-advisor’s greatest deficiency in 
meeting the fiduciary standard is in proactively gathering data, because if the 
questionnaire is ineffective or too limited, the advice is not personalized, and the 
robo-advisor cannot utilize human judgement to proactively seek out new 
information.  For disciplines that require a broad fiduciary scope and information 
from dozens of aspects about the client’s life and an ongoing relationship, like 
comprehensive financial planning, retirement planning, estate planning, or wealth 
management, this lack or insufficiency of information can lead to unfavorable 
results.  We propose a statutory prohibition on the use of pure robo-advisors in these 
contexts.  A hybrid model can be utilized in which the robo-advisor performs the 
services noted above, but the fact-finding and client relationship management 
aspects are managed by the human advisor. Among other ways to effectuate this 
policy, the law could be enforced by assigning liability at the firm level for failure 
to provide human oversight. 
With a statute specifically designed to address the challenges and 
advancements posed by robo-advisor platforms, industry professionals and 
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